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Abstract 
The m9St common indicator of the financial performance of development finance institutions, 
the Subsidy Dependence Index of Yaron ( l 992a), fails to recognize that subsidies are like equity 
injections whose use over time has a cost. Thus, the SDI underestimates subsidy. This paper gives 
a modified framework that counts all subsidies as equity injections. The paper also recasts the 
traditional SDI formula to clarify its definition and to show its invariance with respect to the form 
of subsidized resources. The modified framework is applied to the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and 
to Caja los Andes, a micro finance organization in Bolivia. The underestimation of the traditional 
measure is material. The modified framework could be applied to any subsidized organization. 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Why measure subsidy? 
How to Measure the Subsidy Received 
By a Development Finance Institution 
by 
Mark Schreiner 
The goal of development finance institutions is to improve the welfare of the poor people 
who buy its financial services. This is so whether the DFI is a microfinance NGO or whether it is a 
public development bank. A big cog in this goal is self-sustainability (Krahnen and Schmidt, 1994). 
In tum, self-sustainability hinges on financial self-sufficiency (Khandker et al., 1995). A subsidized 
DFI is financially self-sufficient if it could provide the same services without subsidy. 
Measuring subsidy matters because measuring financial self-sufficient matters. Financial self-
sufficiency means the DFI would not shrink if it had to pay market prices for all its resources. 
Financial self-sufficiency matters because access to subsidized resources waxes and wanes with the 
whims of donors. If a DFI is not financially self-sufficient when donors withdraw, then it will shrink. 
Eventually, it will die and abandon its clients. 
An indicator of financial self-sufficiency is more practical than a full-blown benefit-cost 
analysis. Measuring financial self-sufficiency requires measuring social costs, which is cheap, but 
benefit-cost analysis requires measuring benefits, which is costly (Von Pischke and Adams, 1980; 
David and Meyer, 1980). For transactions between DFis and donors, financial self-sufficiency 
implies that social benefits exceed social costs because the DFI could compensate society for its 
costs. For transactions between DFis and clients, the benefits must exceed the costs or else the clients 
would buy financial services elsewhere. If no one loses, then everyone wins. 
A DFI is subsidized if society, through donors, entrusts it with subsidized resources. 
Subsidized resources have below-market prices and come involuntarily from taxpayers. The 
expenses of an unsubsidized DFI are more than the expenses of an otherwise-identical subsidized 
DFI. The difference is the subsidy, a cost not counted as an expense. 
Donors want to measure subsidy because they want to know how far the fledgling DFI could 
fly in the market. Donors want to know this for least three reasons. Each reason boils down to the 
scarcity of donor resources compared to the abundance of better welfare wanted by poor people. 
The author is grateful for talks with Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, Douglas Graham, and Jacob Y aron. 
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The first reason donors want to measure subsidy is because a financially self-sufficient DFI 
could attract capital from selfish private investors. Private capital would free donors to ply their trade 
elsewhere. In addition, there is more private capital than donor capital, so private capital could 
expand development finance to many times the size possible with only donor capital (Rosenberg, 
1994). 
The second reason donors want to measure subsidy is because the DFis are many but the 
donor dollars are few. Donors want to allocate resources earmarked for development finance to the 
DFis with the biggest bang for the buck. 
The third reason donors want to measure subsidy is because development finance is only one 
of many ways society could improve the welfare of the poor. Donors want to allocate resources to 
the use-development finance, sports stadiums, or primary education for girls-with the biggest 
bang for the buck. 
Like donors, the managers of a DFI also want to measure subsidy. Managers care about 
subsidy not because they care so much for the welfare of the poor but rather because they care about 
their own jobs. Employees at DFis usually enjoy unusually high pay and the perk of warm feelings 
from helping the poor. There are few jobs so good in low-income countries. If donors withdraw and 
the DFI shrinks and dies, then managers will lose their good jobs. Thus, managers want to measure 
subsidy to know how far they are from being able to survive donor withdrawal. 
Financial self-sufficiency is seen from the point of view of the DFI. The opportunity cost of 
subsidized resources from the point of view of the DFI is less than the opportunity cost of resources 
from the point of view of donors or of society. Still, because the opportunity cost of the DFI probably 
is more than the opportunity cost of society, financial self-sufficiency from the point of view of the 
DFI implies worthwhileness from the point of view of society. Financial self-sufficiency is sufficient, 
but not necessary, for the social benefits of a DFI to be more than social costs. 
1.2 How is subsidy measured now? 
The most common indicator of the financial performance of development finance institutions 
is the Subsidy Dependence Index (Yaron 1997; 1994; 1992a; 1992b). The SDI eschews the 
accounting point of view of a subsidized DFI. Instead, the SDI takes the economic point of view of 
a hypothetical unsubsidized DFI. The financial statements of subsidized DFis usually ignore 
subsidies or handle them in arbitrarily. In addition, expenses for the use of subsidized resources 
reflect below-market prices. Thus, the expenses in the financial statements are smaller than the 
opportunity cost of the subsidized resources to the DFI. The genius of the traditional SDI is to inject 
economic logic into the accounting information using the assumed opportunity cost of subsidized 
resources to the DFI. 
The gist of the traditional SDI (SD Ir) framework is the calculation of subsidy (S7). The SD Ir 
is the "percentage increase in the [DFI's] average on-lending interest rate required to compensate 
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for the elimination of subsidies" (Y aron, l 992a, p. 16). This is a linear function of sr. The SDI is a 
ratio of compensated subsidy to revenue from lending: 
r Compensated subsidy Subsidy, - True profits, 
SDI = I = ---------
( Rev. from lending, Rev. from lending, (1) 
The compensated subsidy csr is the subsidy net of the transfer of resources that would be 
needed to keep the same services without subsidized resources and with zero profit. 
The SDfF is simple, and its logic is common sense. It is widely accepted, and it has become 
the center of any serious analysis of the performance ofDFis (e.g., Hashemi (1997); Gonzalez-Vega, 
et al., 1997a; Chaves and Quiros, 1996; Khandker et al., 1995; Schreiner and Gonzalez-Vega, 1995; 
Gurgand, et al., 1994). In fact, the belief that micro finance can reach the masses self-sustainably is 
based mostly on SDffs (Christen et al. 1995, Benjamin, 1994). 
Despite the simplicity and popularity of the SDfF, some changes have been proposed. The 
changes ofKhandker et al. (1995) are shown by Morduch (1997) to be mistaken. Cosmetic changes 
to the traditional SDI have been proposed by SEEP (1995), the Inter-American Development Bank 
(1994), and Holtmann and Mommartz (1996). 
Christen ( 1997) and Benjamin (1994) improve the SDI" materially. Christen ( 1997) adjusts 
the income statement so that expenses include the opportunity cost to the DFI of subsidized 
resources. He also removes grants from revenue. This creates financial statements amenable to the 
traditional techniques of financial analysis for commercial banks. This opens the door to peer 
comparisons, an important management tool and motivator (Richardson, et al., 1993; Koch, 1992). 
Christen does not, however, recognize that subsidized equity can be more than the total accounting 
equity. Benjamin (1994) considers the different risk premia of debt and equity, an important and 
necessary complication first suggested by Y aron ( 1992b ). 
1.3 How should subsidy be measured? 
From an economic point of view, all subsidies are like to equity injections. This paper 
modifies the SD!r to account for this fact. A DFI that is financially self-sufficiency could pay the 
same return to society for an injection of equity as the DFI would have to pay to a private investor. 
This return is the opportunity cost of the DFI, and it is also the opportunity cost of the private 
investor. It is the return the private investor could have expected from an investment of like risk. 
sr is a lower bound on the DFI's expenses if it replaced subsidized resources from donors 
with equivalent unsubsidized resources from the market. In reality, the DFI does not pay a market 
price for the use of its subsidized resources. Therefore, it is as if the DFI got another transfer of 
subsidized resources equal to the subsidy that was not paid. This follows from the logic of the SD Ir 
framework itself. 
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The SDf' framework ignores this implicit equity injection. The modification proposed here 
just takes the logic of the traditional framework to its full end. Private entities would not entrust 
resources to a DFI unless the DFI paid the opportunity cost of the resources in the long run. The 
modified framework gives a lower bound on subsidy that is higher than the lower bound in the 
traditional framework. 
The modification matters both in a single period and over a series of periods. In a single 
period, there is a transfer of subsidized resources implicit in the subsidies received and kept by the 
DFI. There is an opportunity cost to the DFI for the use of the res,;mrces provided by the non-
payment of the full price of subsidized resources. There is a subsidy on the subsidized resources 
made from a subsidy. If the DFI did not pay a private entity for the use of resources entrusted to it, 
then the private entity would count the unpaid return as a further investment. A private investor 
would expect above-average returns later to make up for below-average returns now. 
Over a series of periods, the measure of subsidy should include not only the subsidy on 
subsidized resources from the subsidy received in the current period, but also the subsidy on 
subsidized resources from subsidies received in previous periods. This follows from the logic of the 
private investor and the logic of the SD Ir itself. 
1.4 Does the difference between measures of subsidy matter? 
The difference between the subsidy measured by the traditional and modified frameworks 
is not the useless sandbox play of alternative-assumptions-thus-alternative-conclusions scorned by 
McCloskey ( 1996). In practice, the difference is big. How big? For the Grameen Bank, the difference 
in 1994 is about $7 million, and the accumulated difference from 1986 to 1994 is about $42 million 
in 1994 dollars (Table 6). For Caja los Andes, the difference in 1995 is about $550,000, and the 
accumulated difference over the four years of Andes' life is about $1.1 million in 1995 dollars (Table 
12). 
This is a lot of money. But it is small change for the organizers of the Global Microcredit 
Summit in Washington D.C. in Feb. 1997. They made the lofty goal of giving access to financial 
services to 100 million of the world's poorest people by 2005 with a budget of $21.6 billion (The 
Economist, 1997). In the United States, the bill H.R. 1129 of March 19, 1997 would earmark $170 
million in 1998 and $180 million in 1999 for development finance in low-income countries (New 
York Times, 1997). Development finance is even touted as a way to help U.S. welfare recipients get 
themselves a job (WaU Street Journal, 1997). 
These are wonderful goals. The problem is that the assumption that the benefits are more than 
the costs is based on a handful of projects. The few DFis that have been judged as successful have 
achieved that status because SD/rs showed them as either almost financially self-sufficient or just 
barely financially self-sufficient (Khandker, et. al., 1995; Christen et al. 1995, Benjamin, 1994). But 
if the SDfr underestimates subsidy and therefore overestimates financial self-sufficiency, then 
development finance may not be such a good use of scarce development resources after all. 
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This paper modifies the SD fr framework. The modified framework capitalizes subsidies just 
as a private investor would capitalized unrealized returns. Subsidy in the modified framework is a 
higher lower bound than is subsidy in the traditional framework. This ratchets the performance 
benchmark of DFis up a notch. 
Subsidy should be measured not only at a point in time but also over time. It would not make 
sense to judge the benefits and costs of a dam that took five years to build by looking only at the 
benefits and costs in the sixth year. It also does not make sense to judge the benefits and costs of 
development finance by looking only at one period. It is true that past costs are sunk for some 
analyses so that the relevant measure of subsidy should ignor~ past subsidies. But usually even these 
analyses is enriched by looking at subsidies in the long term. "The Parable of the Subsidized 
Servant" in Appendix 1 shows how the differences between the traditional and the modified 
frameworks can matter both in a single period and over a series of periods. 
The paper is also didactic. There have been many errors and misinterpretations of the SDI" 
formula. This paper reformulates the SDI" in terms of well-defined basic accounts so that the formula 
itself shows the economic concepts behind it. The reformulation also shows that the SDF is invariant 
to the way the DFI receives resources. 
The paper has four more sections. Section 2 is a typology of the ways a DFI can receive 
subsidized resources. Section 3 recasts Yaron's (l 992a) SD!r in terms of the accounts of a set of 
stylized financial statements. Section 4 modifies the framework so that it counts the subsidies made 
by the subsidized resources that are unpaid subsidies. Section 5 gives the traditional and modified 
measures for the Grameen Bank and for Caja los Andes. It also uses the modified measure in a 
pseudo-benefit-cost analysis. 
2. Typologies of subsidized resources 
A DFI can receive subsidized resources explicitly or implicitly. A DFI gets subsidized 
resources explicitly when it gets things for free. Examples include cash grants or donated assets such 
as computer equipment or vehicles. Explicit transfers are often recorded in the accounts. 
A DFI receives subsidized resources implicitly when it pays a below-market price or when 
a donor pays for something bought by the DFI. For example, a donor may pay for training of 
employees of the DFI or for an analysis by a consultant. Or donors may lend funds cheaper than 
private sources would lend. Likewise, donors may not demand returns on equity investments as a 
private investors would. Such transactions make subsidized resources by letting the DFI use 
resources that otherwise it would have paid and lost. 
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2.1 Subsidized resources are not subsidies 
The concept of subsidized resources is not the same as the concept of subsidies. Subsidized 
resources are entrusted to the DFI at a below-market prices. Subsidy is the difference between the 
market price of a subsidized resource and what the DFI pays. 
Suppose soc!ety entrusts a DFI with the use of $100 for a year with a loan without interest. 
Suppose m is the market rate of interest for such a loan to a borrower as risky as the DFI. The 
subsidized resources gained by the DFI as a result of the loan is the difference between the 
opportunity cost and what is paid $100·(m-c). The subsidy from the use of the subsidized resources 
for a year is not $1 OO·(m-c) but rather m·$ l OO·(m-c). The $100 of loan principal itself is neither a 
subsidy nor a subsidized resource. 
The concept of subsidized resources is linked to the concept of subsidies. Subsidies from the 
use of subsidized resources do not go away; they become subsidized resources and make more 
subsidies. The SD/r ignores this link. 
Suppose a DFI got $100·m as a subsidy from a loans of$100. If the DFI were unsubsidized, 
it would pay this $1 OO·m, and it would need to increase its average debt in the period by $1 OO·m/2 
to keep the same level of service as in the subsidized case. It would pay $1 OO·m2/2 for this extra debt. 
The $1 OO·m2/2 is also subsidized resources since it is a resource the DFI would not have if it were 
not subsidized. 
2.2 A DFI can receive subsidized resources in six ways 
Two of the six ways a DFI can receive subsidized resources are explicit, and four are implicit. 
The first way a DFI can receive subsidized resources is explicitly as a cash grant accounted for as 
an equity injection. The subsidy is not the grant itself but rather the return the DFI would pay in the 
long-run for capital from a private investor. The opportunity cost is the opportunity cost of equity, 
as it is for all types of subsidized resources. 
The second way a DFI can receive subsidized resources is explicitly as a cash grant accounted 
for as revenue. All grants should be accounted for not as revenue but rather as equity injections. This 
is because grants are not from the DFI's business operations. Still, DFis inflate accounting profits 
by counting grants as revenue. The economic effects of grants accounted for as revenue are the same 
as the economic effects of grants accounted for as equity injections. Both increase equity. As always, 
the subsidy is not the grant itself but rather the increase in the usage cost the DFI would incur if the 
extra equity from the grant had come from private investors. 
The third way a DFI can receive subsidized resources is implicitly as discounts on subsidized 
debt. The discount is the difference between the market price for debt of similar risk from private 
lenders and the price the DFI paid to donors. The discount is not the subsidy. The subsidy is the 
opportunity cost of the use of the subsidized resources provided by the discount. The discount 
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reduces expenses, increases profits, increases retained earnings, and so increases equity. Thus the 
opportunity cost on subsidized resources provided as discounts on subsidized debt is the opportunity 
cost of equity. 
The fourth way a DFI can receive subsidized resources is implicitly as discounts on operating 
expenses due to a donor's paying for something bought by the DFI. Such purchases are discounts 
on operating expenses only if the DFI does not record the full price of the purchase as an expense 
and, in the case of assets; if the DFI fails to record the asset on the balance sheet. If either of these 
conditions are not met, then the transaction is either unsubsidized or falls into one of the other five 
ways of receiving subsidized resources. Discounts on operating expense decrease expenses, increase 
profits, increase retained earnings, and increase the amount of equity belonging to society. The 
subsidy on the subsidized resources created by discounts on operating expenses is the unpaid 
opportunity cost on the extra equity. In practice, discounts on operating expenses are varied, 
common, and elusive. They leave no trace in the financial statements. Examples of discounts on 
operating expenses include exemption from reserve requirements or coverage of training costs or 
organization expenditures. 
The fifth way a DFI can receive subsidized resources is implicitly as discounts on capitalized 
subsidies. Capitalized subsidies are subsidies for which the DFI has not yet reimbursed society. As 
discussed above, these subsidies make subsidized resources with an opportunity cost. 
The sixth way a DFI can receive subsidized resources is implicitly as reinvestments of 
positive profits. Positive profits belong to owners. If they are not withdrawn, they are implicitly 
reinvested. Retained earnings have an opportunity cost just like any other form of equity. 
The opportunity cost of all six types of subsidized resources is the opportunity cost of 
subsidized equity. The opportunity cost of subsidized equity is the return a private investor would 
expect in the long run for an investment of similar risk to the DFI. 
Subsidized equity is the resources entrusted by donors to the DFI. Subsidized equity includes 
grants accounted for as equity, grants accounted for as revenue, capitalized subsidies, and any 
portion of positive retained earnings due to donors. Subsidized equity also includes discounts on debt 
and discounts on operating expenses. If the change in retained earnings in any period would have 
been negative without subsidies, then subsidized equity will be more than total accounting equity. 
This is the usual case in practice. 
Subsidized resources are the same regardless of which of the six ways they are received by 
the DFI. Likewise, the subsidy linked to subsidized resources does not depend on the form of the 
subsidized resources. Cash is fungible, implicit cash even more so. 
Measured subsidy should not depend on the form of the subsidized resources. If it did, then 
donors and accountants could give a DFI subsidized resources in ways that implied less subsidy than 
would other ways that are identical from an economic point of view. If the measured subsidy is not 
8 
invariant to the form of the subsidized resources, then a DFI could have different estimates of 
subsidies depending on whether it got $100 as a grant recorded as equity, as a grant $100 recorded 
as revenue, as a discount on subsidized debt, as $100 of free training, as a discount on capitalized 
subsidies, or as unwithdrawn positive profits. 
The next section recasts Yaron's (l 992a) SDI' framework in terms of the accounts of a set 
of stylized financial statements. The reformulation uncovers two important facts buried in the 
traditional formula. First, sr is invariant to the way the DFI receives subsidized resources if a 
definition is clarified. Second, the SDI" correctly excludes subsidized resources and includes only 
subsidies. 
3. A reformulation of the traditional subsidy framework 
Probably the most oft-quoted passage in development finance is the definition of the SDI 
(Y aron, l 992a, p. 17). The definition here follows the passage except in using different opportunity 
costs for debt and for equity: 
where 
SD!r = 
I 
A, ·(mdt - c1) + SE, ·met + K, - P1 
LP, ·t, 
md, = Opportunity cost to the DFI of debt, 
met = Opportunity cost to DFI of equity, 
A 1 = Average periodic subsidized debt, 
c1 = Periodic interest rate paid on subsidized debt, 
SE, = Average periodic subsidized equity, 
P 1 = Accounting profit, 
LP 1 = Average periodic net loan portfolio, and 
i, = Average on -lending interest rate. 
(2) 
K, is a plug. It cancels with other parts of the formula so as to exclude subsidized resources 
and to include subsidies. But the original definition of K, is hazy. Yaron (1992a, p. 17) says K, is "the 
sum of all other types of [periodic] subsidies received by the DFI in the period (such as partial or 
complete coverage of the DFI's operational costs by the state)". This makes it clear that K, should 
include discounts on operating expenses and that K, should exclude both discounts on subsidized 
equity and discounts on subsidized debt. But it is unclear whether K, should include grants accounted 
for as revenue and/or grants accounted for as equity. Yaron (1992a) implies that K, excludes grants 
accounted for as revenue by saying "all other types of [periodic] subsidies" [italics added] because 
accounting profit already includes grants accounted for as revenue. To add to the confusion, K, is 
called "miscellaneous subsidies" (p. 53). K, is defined explicitly below. 
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The idea of the SD Ir is ( 1 ), and the implementation of the idea is (2). The two denominators 
in (1) and in (2) are obviously the same. But the two numerators are not obviously the same. Many 
users of the SDF (e.g. Khandker et al., 1995) say that A/(md, - c,) + K, +SE, me, is the subsidy 
received in the period. But this is wrong. Only the term SE, me, is subsidy. K1 is a plug and it includes, 
as will be shown, not subsidy but rather some forms of subsidized resources. Likewise, A/(md1 - c1) 
is not subsidy but rather the discount on subsidized debt. Finally, P, in (2) is accounting profits, not 
profits without subsidies as in ( 1 ). 
3.1 Non-accounting data 
Both accounting and non-accounting data are used to estimate subsidy. The non-accounting 
data are the opportunity cost of subsidized debt, the opportunity cost of subsidized equity, and any 
discount on operating expenses. The opportunity costs of subsidized debt and of subsidized equity 
are counterfactual quantities that must be assumed by the analyst guided by Yaron ( l 992b) and 
Benjamin ( 1994 ). The DFI or donors must divulge any discounts on operating expenses. 
Yaron says the SDI'" estimates financial self-sustainability by taking "full account of the 
overall social costs entailed in operating a DFI" (l 992b, p. iii). The opportunity cost of equity used 
by the SD Ir is not, however, the opportunity cost of society. Rather, it is the opportunity cost of the 
DFI. It is not the return society could get on its resources in their best other use but rather the price 
the DFI would pay for equivalent resources from the market. 
In general, the opportunity costs of society and of the DFI are not the same. For example, a 
weak DFI may not be able to borrow $1,000 from a private lender without paying an annual rate of 
interest of 100 percent. The opportunity cost to society of $1,000, however, is probably between 10 
to 20 percent per year. 
Thus, the SD Ir framework does not measure social costs. It does not take the point of view 
of society. It takes the point of view of the DFI. Which point of view matters depends on the question 
the analysis intends to inform. It is easy to adjust the framework to account for social costs by basing 
mc11 and me, on the opportunity costs of society. Section 5 has an example. 
3. 2 Accounting data from the income statement 
The non-accounting data are combined with accounting data from the financial statements. 
Tables 1, 2, 7, and 8, are examples of sets of stylized financial statements for the Grameen Bank and 
for Caja los Andes. For revenue in the income statement in Tables 1 and 7: 
Revenue operations, = Revenue lending, + Revenue other operations,, and 
Total revenue, = Revenue operations, + Grants as revenue,. 
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For expenses in the income statement: 
Total expenses, = Acct. expense subsidized debt, + Acct. expense other operations,. 
The accounts do not record True expense for subsidized debt, nor Discount for subsidized 
debt,. But given that: 
and taking the periodic average of stocks as the sum of the opening and closing balances divided by 
2, then A,-(md, - c,) is the Discount on subsidized debt,: 
A, ·(mdt - c,) = A, ·md, - A, ·c,, 
= (md/2)·(Sub. debt,_ 1 +Sub. debt,) - A,·(Exp. sub. debt/A,), 
= True exp. sub. debt, - Exp. sub. debt,, 
= Disc. sub. debt,. 
(3) 
The True expense for subsidized debt, is the sum of the expense in the accounts and the 
discount on subsidized debt: 
True exp. debt, = Exp sub. debt, + Disc. sub. debt,. (4) 
The identity for operating expenses is similar: 
True exp. other op., = Acct. exp. other op., + Disc. other op.,. (5) 
Accounting profit is total revenue less total expenses. This can be expressed in terms of 
operating revenues, true expenses, and transfers of subsidized resources as grants and discounts: 
Acct. profit, = (Total rev., - Total exp.,), 
= (Rev. op., + Grants as rev.,) -
(Acct. exp. debt, + Acct. exp. other op.,), 
= (Rev. op., + Grants as rev.,) -
[ (True. exp. sub. debt, - Disc. sub. debt,) + 
(True. exp. other op., - Disc. other op.1 )]. 
(6) 
True profit, is revenue from operations less true expenses, or what accounting profit would 
have been without subsidies. True profit, removes grants accounted for as revenue and discounts on 
expenses from Accounting profit, in (6): 
True profit, = Rev. op., - (True. exp. sub. debt, + True. exp. other op.,), 
= Acct. profit, - (7) 
(Grants as rev., + Disc. sub. debt, + Disc. other op.,). 
Retained earnings links the income statement to the balance sheet: 
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AR.E.1 = Acct. profit,, 
= True profit, - (Grants as rev., + Disc. sub. debt, + Disc. other op.,). (8) 
The SD Jr assumes no private owners and no dividends. This is relaxed later. 
3. 3 Accounting data from the balance sheet 
In the assets in the balance sheet in Tables 2 and 8: 
Total assets, = Net loan portfolio, + Other assets,. 
For liabilities: 
Total liabilities, = Subsidized debt, + Other liabilities,. 
In each of the three sets of equity accounts, closing equity is the sum of opening equity and 
the change in equity. The book value of shares bought by private investors with their own money are 
counted in Paid-in capital,. The book value of shares bought by donors are counted in Grants as 
equity,. The sum of the three closing equity accounts is Total equity,: 
Close paid-in cap.1 = Open paid-in cap.1 + APaid-in cap.1 , 
Close cap. grants, = Open cap. grants, + Grants as equity1 , 
Close R.E.1 = Open R.E.1 + AR.E.1 , and 
Total equity, = Close paid-in cap.1 + Close cap. grants, + 
Close R.E.1 • 
3. 4 The formula for the traditional measure of subsidy in terms of accounts 
Given md, and m"' and Discounts on other operating expenses,, the SDI'" can be expressed in 
terms of the accounts from the stylized financial statements. (3) puts the first term in the numerator 
of (2), A/(md, - c1), in terms of the accounts. 
Expressing SE1,.·met• the second term in the numerator of equation (2), in terms of accounts 
uses three facts. First, the average subsidized equity used in the period, SE/, is the average of the 
TSE1_/ and TSE/, the subsidized equity outstanding at the opening and at the closing of the period. 
Second, TSE1r is the sum of TSE1_1 rand the change in subsidized equity during the period, LJTSE/. 
Third, LJTSE/ is Grants as equity1 plus LJR.E. 1: 
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T T T SE, ·m., = (m./2)·(TSEt-t + TSE, ), 
= (m./2)·(TSE,~1 + TSE,~1 + ATSE,r), 
T 
= m./TSE,_ 1 + (m./2)·(Grants as equity, + AR.E.1 ), 
1-1 
= m./[L (Grants as equity1 + AR.E.1)] + 
1=1 
(m./2)·(Grants as equity, + AR.E). 
(9) 
The numerator of (2) is the traditional measure of compensated subsidy CS/. It combines the 
definition of K, below with (3), (7), (8), and (9): 
cs,T = Disc. sub. debt, + 
/-( 
m., · [ L (True profits1 + Grants as equity1 + Grants as rev.1 + 
l=l 
Disc. sub. debt1 + Disc. other op.;)] + 
(m./2) ·(True profits, + Grants as equity, + Grants as rev. 1 + 
Disc. sub. debt, + Disc. other op.1 ) + 
K -/ 
(True profit, + Grants as rev.1 + Disc. sub. debt, + Disc. other op.). 
(10) 
The first line of ( 10) is A/(md, - c,), the second through fifth lines are SE/·me1, the sixth line 
is K,, and the last line is Pr (10) is just a reformulation of the traditional compensated subsidy in the 
numerator of (2). Nothing has been modified yet. 
If the measured subsidy is to be invariant to how the DFI receives subsidized resources, then 
all types of subsidized resources must enter (10) symmetrically. This requires: 
K 1 = Grants as rev.1 + Disc. other op.1 • (11) 
This definition of K, is not in any of the plethora of papers and reports using the SD!r, 
although SEEP (1995), the Inter-American Development Bank (1994), and Holtmann and 
Mommartz (1996) do use this definition implicitly by removing grants accounted for as revenue from 
their definition of Pr Most users of Yaron's (1992a) formula either set K, equal to zero or to 
Discounts on other operating expenses,. If there were grants recorded as revenue in period t, then 
these SD!rs are wrong. Many DFis, especially microfinance NGOs, have some grants accounted for 
as revenue. 
Without the definition of K, in ( 11 ), all the forms of subsidized resources would not enter the 
subsidy formula symmetrically, so the measured subsidy would depend on arbitrary decisions by 
donors and/or accountants. This is bad because the economic cost of the use of a unit of subsidized 
resources are the same regardless of the form of the subsidized resources. 
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The definition of K, in (11) makes measured subsidy invariant to how the DFI received 
subsidized resources. All forms of subsidized resources received before period tare multiplied by 
me" and all forms of subsidized resources received in period tare multiplied by (me/2). Combining 
( 11) with (10) gives the reformulation of the traditional compensated subsidy: 
1-1 
CS, r = met· L (True profits, + Four new sub. rsrc) + 
i=I 
(me/2)·(True profits, + Four new sub. rsrc.1 ) -
True profit,, 
T 
= S, - True profit1 • 
(12) 
The first two lines of ( 12) are the opportunity cost of the subsidized equity used by DFI in 
the period. The last line is the amount the DFI could have paid for its subsidized resources if true 
profits were to be zero. In the traditional framework, a positive compensated subsidy implies 
financial self-sufficiency. 
3.5 Strengths of the reformulation of the traditional measure of subsidy 
The reformulation in ( 12) has at least five strengths compared to the traditional formula in 
(2). The first strength is to show the invariance of the framework to the way a DFI receives 
subsidized resources. Grants accounted for as revenue and grants accounted for as equity do not 
appear explicitly in (2) but rather slither in by their effects on equity. K1 appears in (2) even though 
it is not subsidy but rather subsidized resources and even though it is not clearly defined. Likewise, 
A/(mJ, - c) appears in (2) even though it stands not for subsidies but rather for subsidized resources. 
The reformulation shows that the subsidy is the opportunity cost of subsidized resources multiplied 
by the subsidized resources used in the period. 
The second strength of the reformulation is to show that although the opportunity cost of debt 
mJ, matters for the discount on subsidized debt, the opportunity cost of this discount is me,· It is not 
obvious in (2) that all forms of subsidized resources have the same opportunity cost. 
The third strength of the reformulation is to show that compensated subsidy is the difference 
between subsidy and profits without subsidy. In contrast to the appearance of (2), subsidy is not 
A/(mJ, - c,) + SE/·me1 + K,. Nor are profits without subsidy Pr 
The fourth strength of the reformulation is to show the that there is an opportunity cost on 
the profits without subsidy earned in period t itself. This is not obvious in (2). 
The fifth strength of the reformulation is to show how subsidized resources received in 
previous periods still ~have an opportunity cost in the current period. This is in the traditional 
framework, but it is buried. 
------- ------------
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Section 4 shows and fixes two big mistakes in the traditional framework as embodied in (12). 
First, the traditional framework wrongly counts negative profits and negative retained earnings as 
negative subsidized resources. Second, the traditional framework fails to capitalize subsidies. 
Subsidies should be capitalized because they are implicit injections of equity. 
4. The Modified Framework 
4.1 Negative true profits are not negative subsidized resources 
(12) shows that there is an opportunity cost on True profits, in the period itself. This hints at 
a problem. If profits in a period are positive, having an opportunity cost makes sense. The owners 
of the DFI could have claimed these profits as they were earned. Instead, the owners let the DFI keep 
using them. This is like an injection of equity. 
But if profits are negative, then having an opportunity cost does not make sense. Negative 
profits are not claims by the DFI on owners. Negative profits do not decrease the investment owners 
had made in the DFI. 
Suppose a donor grants $100 to a new DFI as equity. In the first period, the DFI makes a true 
profit of -$100. Even though the DFI would have paid$ lOO·m"' if it did not have subsidized equity, 
there is no change in subsidized resources by the traditional measure in (12). Thus the traditional 
measure of subsidy received in the period by the DFI, S/, is zero. 
This estimate of S/ is wrong. It should be at least $1 OO·mer Even the traditional measure of 
compensated subsidy, CS/, is wrong. CS/ is just $100, but if the DFI bought everything on the 
market, it would need at least $100 + $1 OO·me, more profits just to break even. 
If profits are positive, they are subsidized resources. But if profits are negative, they are not 
negative subsidized resources. To avoid unnecessarily underestimating subsidy and thereby 
overestimating financial self-sufficiency, True profits, in the subsidy part of (12) should be replaced 
with Max(O, True profits,): 
t-1 
S, = me,· L (True profits; + Four new sub. rsrc) + 
i=I 
(me/2)·[Max(O, True profits,)+ Four new sub. rsrc.,]. 
(13) 
In practice, (13) is not the same as (12) because the usual case is true profits to be negative. 
But (13) is true to the logic of the traditional framework. This modification means that subsidized 
equity will be more than total equity if True profits, is negative. This may seem odd, but it makes 
sense. In the example above, the owners had a claim on the DFI worth $100 even though total 
accounting equity was zero. If the DFI were capitalized privately, investors would still expect a 
periodic return of at least me, in the long run regardless of the level of accounting equity in the short 
run. This modification increases subsidized equity and so increases the estimate of subsidy and 
decreases the estimate of financial self-sufficiency. 
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Without subsidies, retained earnings would be the sum of true profits in previous periods. 
The sum of true profits in previous periods is the sum of accounting profits in previous periods less 
accumulated transfers of other subsidized resources, so actual retained earnings are the sum of true 
profits and accumulated transfers of other subsidized resources. 
Positive retained earnings are claims on the DFI by owners. If the owners let the DFI keep 
using these resources, then retained earnings are an implicit equity injection with an opportunity cost. 
The logic of the traditional framework suggests that negative retained earnings are not negative 
subsidized resources. Negative retained earnings are not claims by the DFI on owners and they have 
no opportunity cost. They do not change the investment owners made in the DFI. 
To avoid unnecessarily underestimating subsidy and thereby overestimating financial self-
sufficiency, the summation of True profits; in ( 13) should be replaced with: 
1-1 
Max(O, L True profits), 
I= 1 
grvmg: 
1-1 1-1 
s/ = m.,·Max(O,L True profits,) + m.,· L Four new sub. rsrc.i + 
i=l i=l (13') 
(m./2)·[Max(O, True profits) +Four new sub. rsrc. 1 ]. 
If the summation of true profits in the past is negative, then subsidized equity used in the 
period could be more than total equity even if True profits, is positive. 
4. 2 There are subsidies on subsidized resources from subsidies in the current period 
S,' in (13') ignores subsidies from subsidized resources made by subsidies in period t. If a DFI 
paid market rates for its resources, it would have to get more market resources to replace those lost 
in payments, and those resources would make still more costs to be paid. 
This means that subsidies S,' should be on the right side of equation (13'). To keep invariance, 
S/ should appear symmetrically with the other subsidized resources received by the DFI in period 
t: 
1-1 1-1 
s/ = me,·Max(O,L True profits)+ me1'L Four new sub. rsrc.i + 
i=l i=l 
I (me/2)·[Max(O, True profits,) + S1 +Four new sub. rsrc.1 ]. 
Solving for S/ gives the modified short-run measure of subsidy, S/vfS: 
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t-1 t-1 
S,Ms = [2/(2-me,)]·{me,·Max(O,L True profits;)+ me,· L Four new sub. rsrc.; + 
i=I i=I (14) 
(me/2)·[Max(O, True profits,)+ Four new sub. rsrc.1 ]}. 
The factor [2/(2 - me,)] is more than one as long as me, < 2. This is the normal case, so 
subsidy is increased by including subsidized resources made by subsidies in the period. The modified 
short-run compensated subsidy CS,MS is S/"tS less True profits,. The SD/r is a short-run measure. Its 
modified counterpart is SDJ,MS, the ratio of cs,MS over Revenue from lending,. 
A DFI is financially self-sufficient in the short run if it could have compensated society for 
the subsidies it received and still had a positive true profit: 
MS True profits, ~ S, . (15) 
In this case, the SDI/'tS will be non-positive. This implies that, all else unchanged, the DFI 
could buy all its resources on the market and still break even even if it decreased the average on-
lending interest rate. Financial self-sufficiency in the short-run is probably sufficient, but not 
necessary, for the social benefits of DFI to be more than its social costs from that period on. 
The modified measure of subsidy is bigger than the traditional measure for three reasons. 
First, it does not count negative true profits in the current period as negative subsidized resources. 
Second, it does not count a negative sum of true profits in previous periods as negative subsidized 
resources. Third, it does not ignore subsidized resources created by subsidies in the period. 
4.3 There are subsidies on subsidized resources.from subsidies in past periods 
The SDI/"ts pretends that the DFI has repaid society for subsidies received in past periods. 
Most DFis do not do this. Past subsidies were equity injections that still have an opportunity cost. 
If a DFI bought its resources on the market, it would have to pay, in the long-run, a return equal to 
what those resources could have earned for their owners elsewhere. 
A long-run measure of subsidy s/vlL in period t would include the subsidy received in periods 
1 ... t-1 on the right side of equation (14), symmetrically with the other subsidized resources received 
by the DFI in past periods: 
t-1 t-1 
s,ML = [21(2-me,>]. {met ·Max(O. L True profits;) +met. L (S;ML + Fournewsub.rsrc.;) 
i=1 i=1 (16) 
+(me/2)·[Max(O,Trueprofits1) +Fournewsub.rsrc.,]}. 
Including subsidized resources from subsidies in past periods increases measured subsidy. 
The modified long-run compensated subsidy CS/"lL is S/'fl less True profits,. The ratio of CS,'11L over 
Revenue.from lending, is not very useful. It does not make much sense for a DFI to raise interest rates 
in a single period enough to earn enough to repay past subsidies. 
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A DFI is financially self-sufficient in the long run if: 
I I L True profits; ~ L S;ML. (17) 
i =I I= I 
In this case, the DFI will have so much retained earnings that it could be liquidated and still 
pay for.its subsidies and give back to society all its subsidized resources. The DFI that is financially 
self-sufficient in the long run could pay its debt-to society. 
Long-run financial self-sufficiency is more difficult than short-run financial self-sufficiency. 
Like short-run financial self-sufficiency, long-run financial self-sufficiency is sufficient, but not 
necessary, for the social benefits of DFI to be more than its social costs, including costs in the past. 
4. 4 How to find subsidy with private owners and/or with dividends 
Although most DFis do not have private owners nor do they pay dividends, some of the most 
important DFis do. For example, members of the Grameen Bank own most of its shares (Hashemi, 
1997). 
Dividends paid by a DFI to donors at the end of a period compensate society for the use of 
its resources. Dividends decrease equity by decreasing retained earnings. The share of dividends paid 
to society corresponds to society's share of paid-in equity and grants accounted for as equity at the 
close of the period: 
Closing cap. grants, 
(18) 
Closing cap. grants, + Closing paid-in cap.1 
Dividends are declared at the close of the period. Private owners have a claim on positive 
profits and on positive retained earnings. The share of positive profits and retained earnings 
belonging to society is the share of the average resources entrusted to the DFI by donors to the 
average resources entrusted to the DFI from all sources: 
I - I I - I 
p1 = { L (S;MP +Four new sub. rsrc.;) + Max(O, L P; ·True Profit; - ex;· Div.) + 
; = I i = I 
(l/2)·[S1MP +Fournewsub.rsrc.1 +Max(O, p1·True Profit,)]}· 
t - I 
1 /{ L (S;MP +Four new sub. rsrc.; + !1paid-in cap.) + 
i = I 
t - I 
Max(O, L True Profit1 - Div) + 
i = I 
(1/2)·[S 1MP +Fournewsub.rsrc.1 + !1paid-in cap. 1 + Max(O, True Profit,)]}. 
The modified measure of subsidy with private owners is then: 
(19) 
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1-1 
S,MP = [2/(2 - me1)]·{me1 ·Max(O,L p;·True profits, - a,·Div) + 
i=I 
1-1 
" MP m., · L...J (S; + Four new sub. rsrc.1) + (20) 
i =I 
· (m./2)·[Max(O, p1 ·True profits,) +Four new sub. rsrc.1 ]}. 
The modified measure of compensated subsidy with private owners is: 
MLP MLP • CS, = S1 - (p,·True profits, - a 1 ·D1v.1 ). (21) 
(19) and (20) are two equations in two unknowns, p, and Sr If there are no private owners, 
then .JP aid-in capital, is zero and p, is unity by definition. Even if there are private owners, if True 
profit, is negative, then p, vanishes from the right-hand sides of both ( 19) and (20) and p, is easy to 
find. This is the usual case. If there are also no dividends, then (20) is ( 16). 
Ifthere are private owners and True profit, is positive, then (19) can be solved for p, in terms 
of the unknown Sr Then (20) can be solved numerically for S, and the solution can be plugged into 
( 19) to get p1 for use in future periods: 
where 
I - I L (sl.MLP F b ) a = + our new su s. rsrc.. + I 
i = I 
t-1 
Max(O, L p;·True Profit; - a;·Div.) + (112)·(Four new subs. rsrc.1), and 
i =I 
t - I 
" MLP A d b = L...J (S; + Four new subs. rsrc.; + uPai -in cap) + 
i = I 
1-1 
Max ( 0, L True Profit; - Div.) + 
i = 1 
(1/2)·(Four new subs. rsrc.1 + 11Paid-in cap.1 +True profit,). 
The traditional measures of subsidy in Section 5 below do not adjust for private ownership. 
This overestimates subsidy but make the numbers comparable to previous calculations (e.g., 
Khandker, 1995). 
4. 5 Notes on the use of the modified measures of subsidy 
Both of the modified measures are of subsidy are, like the traditional measures, lower 
bounds. But they are higher lower bounds. 
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Both of the modified measures of subsidy can inform some questions. For example, managers 
of a DFI can stop bothering with donors once the DFI is financially self-sufficient in the short-run. 
A private investor would selfishly invest in starting a similar organization from scratch only 
if a DFI is expected to be financially self-sufficient in the long run. A private investor would selfishly 
invest in an existing DFI only if it is already financially self-sufficient in the short-run. 
Donors can use the measures as comparative tools. Both the short-run and the long-run 
measures can help allocate resources earmarked for development finance. Donors should expect 
more output in the present from DFis who used up more inputs in the past. 
The measure of subsidy can also be turned into a measure of social cost. The opportunity cost 
of equity me, could be defined as the opportunity cost of resources from the point of view of the 
donor with alternative development investments. It could also be seen as the opportunity cost of 
resources from the point of view of the taxpayers with other uses for their money. 
5. Application 
This section measures subsidy with the traditional and modified frameworks for the Grameen 
Bank of Bangladesh and for Caja los Andes, a microfinance NGO in Bolivia. The traditional and 
modified estimates differ a lot. The two DFis are much less financially self-sufficient than was 
thought. 
This section also uses the modified subsidy from the point of view of society in a donor 
leverage ratio, in a donor output ratio, and in a pseudo-benefit-cost analysis. Both DFis probably 
have social benefits that are more than their social costs. 
5.1 The donor leverage ratio 
Rosenberg (1994) conceived the idea of donor leverage. He reasoned that if development 
finance for the poor can be financially self-sufficient and if donors do not have enough funds to 
saturate the market, then donors should focus on leveraging private funds. 
To be useful, donor leverage must be measured. Schreiner and Gonzalez-Vega (1995) and 
Rosenberg et al. ( 1997) used the ratio of the average non-subsidized resources used in a period over 
the average subsidized resources used in a period. If S,'~fls is the modified measure of subsidy in the 
long run from the point of view of society, then the DLR, is: 
- -~~--------
where 
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= Ave. non-subsidized resources, 
Ave. subsidized resources 
t 
I - 1 1-l 
Ave. non sub. rsrc, = L Paid-in cap.;+ Max[O, L (1-p;)·True Profit;-(1-cx1)'Div.1] + 
I = 1 i = 1 
( 1 /2) · { Dep. by poort-1 + Dep. by poor, + 
Other libs.t-1 + Other libs.1 + fl.Paid-in cap.1 + 
Max [ 0, ( 1 - P,) ·True Profit,]}, and 
I - 1 1-l 
"'"' M LS "'"' • Ave. sub. rsrc, = L.t ( 4 new sub. rsrc.; + S; ) +Max [ 0, L.t ( P; ·True Profit;- ex;· Div.;)] + 
i = I ; = 1 
MLS ( 1 /2) ·[Sub. debt,_ 1 +Sub. debt, + S, + 4 new sub. rsrc.1 + 
Max ( 0, p1 • True Profit,)]. 
The DLR, shows how the performance of the DFI has enabled and motivated the use of 
market resources. If the goal of society is to saturate the market, the donors should act so as to 
maximize the DLRr But the goal of society is not to saturate the market; the goal of society is to 
maximize social welfare. Maximizing the DLR, is good only inasmuch as attracting private funds 
to development finance helps maximize social welfare. Attracting private funds is good if it increases 
the number and the volume of voluntary transactions between DFis and clients. More voluntary 
transactions are good because, at least in expectation and at least for those choosing to transact, the 
benefits of voluntary transactions are always more than the costs. The benefits of involuntary, non-
market transactions are not always more than the costs, even in expectation, which is why subsidy 
must be measured in the first place. 
The idea of a DLR, has at least two weaknesses. First, the DLR, looks only at resources 
entrusted to DFis by donors. Second, the DLR, ignores both the benefits of the resources and the 
costs of the resources. 
5. 2 The donor output ratio 
Benefits are the difference in the utility of the clients with and without the DFI. While 
benefits are undoubtedly more than costs, measuring benefits is costly (Von Pischke and Adams, 
1980; David and Meyer, 1980). Still, on average, the monetary value of the benefits is a multiple of 
the average debt in the hands of clients in a period. Average debt is cheap to measure. 
The donor output ratio compares social costs to a fraction of social benefits. The DOR, is the 
ratio of LP,, the average net loan portfolio, over S/'4L, the cost to society of the resources it entrusted 
to the DFI: 
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The DOR, is a multiple of a benefit-cost ratio without discounting. It measures how much 
debt for the target group is sparked by a unit of donor resources. A higher DOR, means more bang 
for the buck, but it does not tell exactly how much more. The period could be of any length, 
including the life of the DFI, but the monetary figures must be in units of a constant currency. 
The reciprocal of the DOR, is the cost to society per dollar-year of debt held by the poor. In 
the long run, it shows the efficiency of the DFI in using society's resources to increase the welfare 
of the target group. 
5. 3 Pseudo-benefit-cost analysis 
The idea of pseudo-benefit-cost analysis recognizes that the goal of development finance is 
to maximize the difference between social benefits and social costs. Pseudo-benefit-cost analysis 
also recognizes that it is cheap to measure social costs but costly to measure social benefits. The 
benefits of a full-blown benefit-cost analysis probably are more than the costs, but the benefits of 
a pseudo-benefit-cost analysis probably are less than the costs. 
Subsidies are a lower bound on social costs. On average, benefits are an unknown multiple 
b of the average debt held by the poor. The average debtor gets an average surplus worth b for each 
dollar-year of debt from a DFI. 
Pseudo-benefit-cost analysis looks at what b would have to be to make the discounted value 
of benefits more than the discounted value of costs. Weights could be used since benefits accrue to 
poor people in low-income countries but costs accrue to rich people in high-income countries. Given 
the modified long-run subsidy in each period from the point of view of society and the average loan 
portfolio in units of a constant currency, if wr and wP are the weights for the rich and the poor and 
o is the discount rate, then: 
T 
'°' 01 "W ·SML L..., r I 
b = _1 =_I ___ _ 
T 
'°' o'·w ·LP L..., p I 
t =I 
If bis small, then subsidizing the DFI probably has increased social welfare. A benefit-cost 
analysis at time 0 with the knowledge at time T would probably have found that the DFI was a 
worthwhile investment of scarce resources from the point of view of society. 
How small is small needs human discussion. Discussion and sensitivity analysis are also 
needed to pick good values for the weights and the discount rate. Since S/1L is a lower bound on 
costs, b is a lower bound on required surplus. 
For some DFis, there are estimates of the marginal product ofcapital for borrowers with the 
Grameen Bank. The lower bound on required surplus b can be compared to the difference between 
these estimates and the effective interest rates plus transactions costs for the borrower (Schreiner, 
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1997). In addition, b can be compared to the difference between the cost of debt from a DFI and the 
cost of similar debt from other sources. This difference is a lower bound on the debtor's surplus. 
Usually, however, people will just have to judge whether bis so small that the debtor's surplus is 
likely to be more. 
5. 4 Application to the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh 
The Grameen Bank of Bangladesh has spawned much fervor for development finance. Began 
as a pilot project in 1976, Grameen was chartered as a bank in 1983. By 1995, it had branches in 
about 35,500 villages, more than half the villages in Bangladesh. It has more than 2 million 
borrowers, more than 90 percent of whom are women (Hashemi, 1997). Grameen holds savings for 
its members, and members own most of the bank's shares. Assets at the end of 1994 were about 
$400 million. 
Grarneen disburses loans through groups of borrowers without collateral. Financial services 
are coupled with teaching economic and social discipline (Khandker et al., 1995). Most members 
own less than half a hectare of land and have assets worth less than the value of one hectare. The 
members are poor by any standard, but they are not the poorest of the poor in Bangladesh. The 
poorest of the poor would burdened by debt, not benefitted (Hashemi, 1997). 
Many studies have estimated the SDI of Grameen (e.g., Hashemi, 1997; Morduch, 1997; 
Khandker et al., 1995; Christen et al., 1995; Benjamin, 1994; Yaron, 1994 and 1992a;). Even 
Hossain (1988) estimated subsidy. The estimates here span from 1983 to 1994 and use the modified 
framework. Technical notes are in Appendix 2. 
Table 1 shows that true profit has been negative every year even though accounting profit has 
been negative only twice. Table 2 shows that about two-thirds of Grameen's funds were subsidized 
by 1994. Table 3 shows that, ignoring 1983, the traditional SDI fell from a high of 168 percent in 
1989 to 20 percent in 1994. Grameen had an average on-lending interest rate between 12 and 19 
percent over this period, ending at 17 percent in 1994. The rate required for a traditional SDI of zero 
ranged from 19 percent to 35 percent, ending at 20 percent in 1994. 
With the traditional SDI, the Grameen Bank looks efficient. An annual interest rate of 20 
percent is low given the costs of making small loans to poor people. The rate charged is only 3 
percentage points from the subsidy-free rate. 
The modified short-run SDI in Table 4 is bigger because it does not ignore the fact that 
subsidies received in the current period make subsidized resources and so more subsidies in the 
current period. The SDf'tS falls from a high of201 percent in 1990 to 27 percent in 1994. Grameen 
would have to increase its interest rate from 17 percent to 21 percent in 1994. Still, this is not a big 
jump, and 21 percent is still low for a lender to the poor. 
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The modified long-run measure of subsidy in Table 4 is even bigger than the modified short-
run measure of subsidy because it does not ignore the fact that subsidies received in previous periods 
make subsidized resources and so more subsidies in the current period. In 1994, the difference 
between 8"'11. and S"'JS was about taka 128 million. With an exchange rate of about 40 taka per dollar, 
this is about $3.2 million. The assumed opportunity cost took a nose dive from 13 percent to 6 
percent between 1993 and 1994 (Table 13 ), so the difference in 1993 is bigger at about taka 182 
· million, or about $4.5 million. 
The modified measures of subsidy from the point of view of society are in Table 5. They 
differ from the measures from the point of view of the DFI in that the opportunity cost of both debt 
and equity was assumed to be 10 percent in each period (Table 13). Thus the subsidy from the point 
of view of society is smaller than the subsidy from the point of view of the DFI in all years except 
1994. Subsidizing Grameen in 1994 cost society about taka 817 million, or about $20 million. In 
1993, it cost about taka 939 million, or about $23.5 million. 
Table 6 summarizes the subsidy measures in units of millions of dollars as of Dec. 31, 1994. 
from the point of view of the DFI, the traditional subsidy was about $9 million in 1993 and about 
$5 million in 1994. The modified short-run subsidy was bigger at about $16 million in 1993 and $8 
million in 1994. The modified long-run subsidy was even bigger at abut $20 million in 1993 and 
about $12 million in 1994. 
Summing the modified long-run measure over time shows that Grameen would have had to 
pay at least $70 million more between 1983 and 1994 to keep the same level of service without 
subsidized resources. This is $42 million more than the traditional estimate. 
Table 6 shows that it cost society at least $58 million to subsidize Grameen from 1983 to 
1994. Was it worth it? The DLR, DOR, and pseudo-benefit-cost analysis in Table 6 address this. 
The long-run DLR of 0.39 in 1994 means that Grameen used one dollar-year of market 
resources for every 2.5 dollar-years of subsidized resources entrusted to it by society. Even though 
the DLR has been falling, its level is not too good. Grameen does not use many market resources. 
It has not leveraged the $0.99 billion dollar-years of resources entrusted to it much. 
The long-run DOR of 2.0 in 1994 means that Grameen put one dollar-year of debt in the 
hands of poor people for each 50 cents of cost to society. This seems like a lot, and the DOR 
worsened until 1994 as the portfolio, starting with 58,000 borrowers in 1983 (Hashemi, 1997), grew 
slower than subsidy, assumed to start at zero. The estimated social cost of 50 cents per dollar-year 
of debt does not include the interest costs paid by borrowers nor the transactions costs they bear. It 
is a matter for debate whether Grameen borrowers could benefit from debt even if they paid society 
for its costs, and thus whether subsidizing Grameen has been worthwhile. 
Pseudo-benefit-cost analysis can inform the debate. Looking from the point of view of society 
in 1983 at the results through 1994, the discounted benefits to borrowers would have been more than 
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the discounted costs to society if the average surplus of the average borrower per dollar-year of debt 
(b) was more than about 7 cents (Table 6). This is not much, although b increased until 1994 for the 
same reasons the DOR increased. 
This estimate of b is somewhat sensitive to the assumed discount rate and opportunity cost. 
For example, if the discount rate is left at 5 percent but the opportunity cost of society is changed to 
20 percent, then b is 19 percent. If the discount rate is set to zero with the opportunity cost set to 1 O 
percent, then b is also 19 percent. If both the discount rate and the opportunity cost are 3 percent, 
then b is 2 percent. 
Grameen is not financially self-sufficient, neither in the short run nor in the long run. True 
profits are negative in all periods, and subsidies are always positive. Accumulated true profits are 
about -$58 million in constant 1994 dollars, whereas accumulated subsidy from the point of view 
of society is, coincidentally, about $58 million. Grameen is not yet financially self-sufficient in the 
short run, and it probably will never be financially self-sufficient in the long run. 
Yet Grameen may have been worthwhile. So there is both bad news and good news. The bad 
news is that Grameen does not yet get much of its funding from the market and that Grameen would 
have been a bad investment for a venture capitalist in 1983. The good news is that Grameen probably 
has increased social welfare. With slightly higher interest rates, Grameen could attract private 
investors beyond its own members. 
5.5 Application to Caja los Andes, a microfinance NGO in Bolivia 
Caja los Andes was founded in Bolivia as a microfinance NGO in 1992. Andes was called 
Pro-Credito until 1995, the year it got a charter that subjected it to prudential regulation and that let 
it mobilize deposits. By the end of 1995, Andes had 8 branches with about 14,000 borrowers, about 
60 percent of whom were women. Assets were about $6.6 million (Gonzalez-Vega et al., 1997b). 
Andes disburses loans to individuals with collateral. Andes does not offer non-financial 
services. Borrowers of Andes are poor, but they are not the poorest of the poor in Bolivia. Three-
fourths of borrowers from Andes in La Paz are in the top two quintiles of an index of basic-needs 
achievement (Navajas et al., 1996). Andes competes with BancoSol, a bigger, more famous DFI that 
lends through groups (Gonzalez-Vega et al., 1997a). 
Gonzalez-Vega et al. (1997b) estimated the traditional SDI for Andes. Technical notes are 
in Appendix 3. 
Table 7 shows that true profit has been always been negative even though accounting profit 
has always been positive. Table 8 shows that about 95 percent of Andes' liabilities and equity were 
subsidized by 1995. Table 9 shows that the traditional SDI had fallen from 211 percent in 1992 to 
93 percent in 1995. The average on-lending interest rate also fell over this period, from 47 percent 
to 23 percent. The rate required for a traditional SDI of zero fell from 148 percent to 43 percent. To 
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double the interest rate in 1995 is less severe than it sounds because the base to be doubled is only 
about 20 percentage points. 
Andes would look financially self-sufficient in the traditional framework if it charged the 
same interest rate in 1995 that it charged in 1992. This suggests that Andes has a positive SD/r not 
because of inefficiency but because of its interest-rate policy. 
The modified short-run measure of subsidy in Table 10 is bigger because it does not ignore 
subsidized resources made by subsidies in the current period. The SDf"S falls from 236 percent in 
1992 to 125 percent in 1995. 
The modified long-run measure of subsidy in Table l 0 is even bigger than the modified 
short-run measure because it does not ignore subsidized resources made by subsidies received in past 
periods. In 1995, the difference was about Bs l million. With an exchange rate of about 5 bolivianos 
per dollar, this. is about $200,000. 
The modified measures of subsidy from the point of view of society are in Table 11. They 
differ from the measures from the point of view of the DFI in that the opportunity cost of both debt 
and equity was assumed to be 10 percent in each period (Table 14). Thus the subsidy from the point 
of view of society is smaller than the subsidy from the point of view of the DFI in all years. 
Subsidizing Andes cost society about Bs 1.8 million in 1995, or about $360,000. 
Table 12 summarizes the subsidy measures in units of millions of dollars as of Dec. 31, 1995. 
From the point of view of the DFI, the traditional subsidy was about $356,000 in 1995. The modified 
short-run subsidy was bigger at about $692,000, and the modified long-run subsidy was even bigger 
at about $909,000. 
Summing the modified long-run measure over time shows that Andes would have had to pay 
at least $2 million more between 1992 and 199 5 if it had kept the same level of service without 
subsidized resources. This is about $1 million more than the traditional estimate. 
From the point of view of society, it cost at least $890,000 to subsidize Andes from 1992 to 
1995 (Table 12). The DLR, DOR, and pseudo-benefit-cost analysis in Table 12 address whether this 
cost was worthwhile. 
The long-run DLR of 0.06 in 1995 means that Grameen used one dollar-year of market 
resources for each 17 dollar-years of subsidized resources entrusted to it by society. This is not very 
good. By 1995, Andes has not leveraged funds from the market with the $11.3 million dollar-years 
of resources entrusted to it. 
The long-run DOR of2.9 in 1995 means that Andes put one dollar-year of debt in the hands 
of poor people for every 34 cents of cost to society. Unlike Grameen, Andes has grown the loan 
portfolio faster than subsidies, so the DOR is increasing. The estimated social cost of 34 cents per 
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dollar-year of debt does not include the interest costs paid by borrowers nor the transactions costs 
they bear. 
Pseudo-benefit-cost analysis can inform the debate about whether subsidizing Andes has 
bee~ worthwhile. From the point of view of society in 1992 with knowledge of the results through 
1995, the discounted benefits to borrowers would have been more than the discounted costs to 
society if the average surplus of the average borrower per dollar-year of debt ( b) was more than about 
10 cents (Table 12). This is not very much, and b is falling. 
This estimate of bis somewhat sensitive to the assumed discount rate and opportunity cost. 
For example, if the discount rate is left at 5 percent but the opportunity cost of society is changed to 
20 percent, then b is 24 percent. If the discount rate is set to zero with the opportunity cost set to 1 O 
percent, then b is 10 percent. If both the discount rate and the opportunity cost are 3 percent, then 
b is 3 percent. 
Andes is not financially self-sufficient, neither in the short run nor in the long run. True 
profits are negative in all periods, and subsidies are always positive. Accumulated true profits are 
about -$1.9 million in constant 1995 dollars, whereas accumulated subsidy from the point of view 
of society is about $0.9 million. 
Still, Andes may have been worthwhile. Subsidizing Andes probably has increased social 
welfare even though Andes gets little funds from the market and even though Andes would not have 
been a good investment in 1992. Andes could attract private investors if it increase its interest rates. 
5. 6 Concluding thoughts 
The examples show that there can be a big difference between the subsidy under the 
traditional and modified framework. There is no reason, other than tradition, not to use the modified 
framework. Both frameworks use the same data, and both are easy to compute. The spreadsheets 
used here are available on request. 
The modified long-run measure does use historical data, but it is still a higher lower bound 
than the traditional measure even if past data is not at hand. Even the short-term modified measure 
is a higher lower bound than the traditional measure. The real work in both frameworks is in judging 
opportunity costs, ferreting out discounts on operating expenses, and analyzing the results. The 
modified framework could be used not only for DFis but also for any subsidized organization that 
wants to escape from dependence on donors. 
The expenses of a subsidized DFI are not the same as the costs the DFI would pay if it had 
to survive in the market. The difference between these costs and expenses is subsidy. The modified 
framework measures costs better because it measures subsidies better. 
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There can be is a big difference between the traditional and the modified measures. For the 
Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, the difference is of the order of $42 million, 150 percent the size of 
the traditional measure. 
Two the best DFls are much ~orse than was thought because their costs are higher than was 
thought. This is true both from the point of view of the DFI and from the point of view of society. 
But pseudo-benefit-cost analysis suggests that at least two of the best DFis have probably improved 
social welfare. 
A DFI can be socially worthwhile even if it is not financially self-sufficient. But short-run 
financial self-sufficiency is still needed to attract private capital to expand existing DFis. Long-run 
financial self-sufficiency is needed to attract private capital to start DFis from scratch so as to expand 
development finance to more than a fraction of the poor in the world. 
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Table 1: Stylized income statement for Grameen 
Organization Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen 
For the year ending 31-Dec-83 31-Dec-84 31-Dec-85 31-Dec-86 31-Dec-87 31-Dec-88 31-Dec-89 31-Dec-90 31-Dec-91 31-Dec-92 31-Dec-93 31-Dec-94 
Rev. lending __________ 0 23 35 44 651--1131--162 2211--337 522_ f---1,056 _l,646 
--- --- -~-
Rev. other op. I 13 31 46 61 53 77 117 143 188 183 296 
Rev. op. __________ l 36 ~_ 66_f __ 90_ _ 126_ ~166+----_239 338+ __ 480 _ __ 710_ 1,238 1,942 
------- - f--- 87 - 76-Grants as rev_ 0 0 0 0 3 34 60 76 73 62 
Total rev. l 36 66 90 129 200 299 414 553 772 f---1,325 _ _ 2,019 
--- --
-
----~· 
True exp. sub. debt 6 22 31 51 122 159 222 265 270 295 587 617 
(Discount sub. debt) (5) (8) (5) (28) (99) (131) ( 183)1 (217) (219) (206) (351) (95) 
Exp. sub. debt ___ I 14 26 24 22 28 39 48 50 89 235 523_ 
_True exp. other op. 3 17 40 66 106 171 257 356 490 689_ f---1,080 _l,474 
(Discount other op.) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Exp. other op. 3 17 40 66 106 I 111 I 257 I 356 I 490 689 1,080 I 1,474 
Total exp. 4 31 65 90 128 198 296 I 40-1 540 778 f---1,316_ _l,997 
-·--- -
·--
Acct. profit (3) 5 I 0 0 I 3 10 13 (6) 9 22 
(Dividends) 0 0 0 0 01 OI 01 0 0 0 0 0 
Change R.E. _____ (3) 5 I 0 0 1 3 10 13 (6) 9 22_ 
---- -·---- --·-·--- - ---
Memo: Rev. op. l_ 36 66 90 126 166 239 338 480 710_ f---1,238 1,942 
--- - _(222~265) - (617) Memo: (True exp. sub. debt)_ 
---
(6) (22) ~(31) __ (51) _(122) ~(159) ~(270) ~(295) (587) 
Memo: (True exp. other op.) (3) (17) (40) (66) (106) (171) (257) (356) (490) (689) ~.080 ---ci,474 
Memo: True profit (8) (3) (5) (27) (102) (164) (239) (283) (280) (274) (429) (150) 
Source: Hashemi (1997) and Khandker et al. (1995). Figures in millions of nominal taka. 
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Table 2: Stylized balance sheet for Grameen 
Organization Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen 
For the year ending 31-Dec-83 31-Dec-84 31-Dec-85 31-Dec-86 31-Dec-87 31-Dec-88 31-Dec-89 31-Dec-90 31-Dec-91 31-Dec-92 31-Dec-93 31-Dec-94 
Assets 
----
__ 634~_1 __ 1,593 _2,117 ----------- -Net loan portfolio 74 178 246 331_ 2,551 4,424 8,764 11,054 
---
-2,290 -2,460 -3,513 - 5,091 Other assets 45 199 300 572 646 816 1,317 1,846 
Total assets 119 377 546 903 __ 1,279_ ___ 1,911 
·- _2,911_1_ - 3,964 ----4,841 6,884 _12,277 16,145 
-- ----
- --·-- - -
- ---- - -
--- - - ----~ - - . 
-- - ----------- .. ·------
Liabilities 
---------~-- ~--------~--311 
---434 955 =1:;~~f. -'·;:; Sub. debt 85 717 1,233 __ 1,876 _ _ 1,878 _5,470 _8,216_ ----·---- -----· -  - - - f---- - . Dep. by poor 19_ 38 80 117 190 293 835 _1,199 _1,955 2,808 
f--·-- -
--- -
-1,534 Other libs. 0 0 0 25 85 178 360 462 729 1,252 1,824 
Total libs. 104 350 514 859 
-- r---
_1,230 r--l,704 l_2,525t-2,991 _3,440 f---4,329 _9,249 _12,557 
Equity 
------·-- ~----- 72 
_Open. paid-in cap. 0 18 25 30 35 42 72 114 149 150 
---- --- 15T-- o -Change paid-in cap. 18 7 5 5 7 15 42 35 1 67 
Close. paid-in cap. __ 18 25 30~35 42 57h72H72F114 149 150 217 -- - ---Open. cap. grants 0 0 (I) (2) 3 1 142 300 874 _1,247 _2,359 _2,793 
-
Grants as equity 0 (1) (1) 5 (2) 141 158 574 374 1,111 435 458 
Close. cap. grants __ 0 (I) (2) 3 1 142~0 874 1,247 2,359 2,793 3,252 ---- 13-
- 26 - 39 - 47 - 84-Open. R.E. ________ 0 (3) 3 4 5 6 8 
------ 2 5-f---- -ChangeR.E. (3) 6 1 1 1 13 13 8 37 36 
Close R.E. (3) 3 4 5 61 8 I 13 26 39 47 84 120 
Total equity 15 27 32 44 49 207 385 972 1,401 2,555 3,028 3,588 
Total libs. and equity 119 377 546 903 1,279 1,911 I 2,911 3,964 I 4,841 6,884 12,277 16,145 
Memo: Ave. dep. by poor_ 9 28 59 98 153 242 369 _ __ 544 739_ 1,017 1,577 2,381 
----
-4,243 -6,245 f---8,176-Memo: Ave. sub. libs. 43 156 217 358 821 _1,083 _1,728 _2,521 f---3,245 
--
-- f---
-
Memo: Ave. net loan port. 37 126 212 288 482 864 1,344 1,855 2,334 3,529 6,561 9,969 
Source: Hashemi (1997) and Khandker et al. (1995). Figures in millions of nominal taka. 
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Table 3: Trad. SDI for Grameen for DFI 
Organization Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Gramccn Grameen Grameen Gramcen Gramecn Grameen 
For the year ending 31-Dec-83 31-Dec-84 31-Dec-85 31-Dec-86 31-Dec-87 31-Dec-88 31-Dec-89 31-Dec-90 31-Dec-91 31-Dec-92 31-Dec-93 31-Dcc-94 
Grants as rev. 0 0 ·~· 3 34*3M 76$373$~( 87 76 ----Grants as equity 0 (I) ___ <? ____ 2~_ (2) 141_ 158 574 374 1,111 435 458_ Disc. sub. debt 5 8 99 131 183 217 219 206 351 95 
- - - - ----·------ ------- ---- - - ------ --- - f---- --- ~------ - -
-
Disc. other op. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 forms new sub. rsrc. 5 7 5 33 100 306 400 867 666 1,379 873 629 
Open. accum. new sub._ 0 5 12 16 49 149 456 856 ___ l,723 f--2,389 f----3,768 f--4,642 
-·--- ---- ---
--
True profit (8) (3) (5) (27) (102) (164) (239) (283) (280) (274) (429) (150) 
Open. accum. true profit_ 0 (8) _(II) (16) (43) _(145) 
_ (309)~_(548) ~(831) ~(l,111 _(1,385) ~(l,814 
----
Trad. subsidy (0) (0) 0 0 I 11 32 84 149 238 339 184 
Trad. comp. subsidy 8 3 5 28 103 175 I 272 I 367 429 / 512 768 334 
Trad SDI 3982% f------12% 14% 63% _158% 155%1 168% ~ __ 166%t----127% 98% 73% 20% 
·-----
- i- ;-------- >------ -
- -- ---
On-lending LR. 1% 19% f------17% f-----15% _13% 13%f 12% 12%Fl4% 15% 16% _17% 
f------21% -33%r--32% -·-32% 33%\--29% >------Subsidy-free on-lending l.R 22% 19% 25% 35% 28% 20% 
Figures in millions of nominal taka. 
31 
Table 4: Mod. SDI for Grameen for DFI 
Onrnnization Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen 
For the vear endinl! 31-Dec-83 31-Dec-84 31-Dec-85 31-Dec-86 31-Dec-87 31-Dec-88 31-Dec-89 31-Dec-90 31-Dec-91 31-Dec-92 31-Dec-93 31-Dec-94 
Grants as rev. 0 0 0 0 
't=rt==:'l_ :-~" l=f' 62 87~76_ Grants as equity _______ 0 (I) __ (I) 5 (2) 141 __ 158 574_ 374 _ l,111 __ 435 458 _ , ___ ~ Disc. sub. debt__ -··· 5 ____ 8_ --- __ 5 28 99 131 183 217 219 ___ 206 ___ 351 95 _ 
·-- -
-- 0 ---- 0-,---- 0 -- - 0 -~ 0 
Disc. other oo. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 new sub. rsrc. 5 7 5 33 100 306 400 867 I 666 1.379 873 629 
Open. accum. new sub._. --- . _o_ 5 ___ 12_ 
---
16 
----
49 149 
----
456 
- - __ 856 _ __ 1,723 _ __ 2,389 f--3,768_ ._4,642 
True orofit (81 (3) (5) (27) <1021 (1641 <239) (283) (280) (274) (429) (150) 
Open. accum. true profit_. 0 (8) ~(II) (16) (43) _(145) _(309) _(548)t--(83 I) _(l,lll) _(1,385) _(1,814) 
Dividends 0 0 0 0 0 o _ ___ o 0 0 0 0 0 
-·-- -
Alpha_ 0.006 ~<0.054) _(0.071) _0.079 ~0.023 _0.714 _0.807 _0.924 _0.916 _0.940 f--0.949 _0.938 
Rho short-run 0.233 f--0.305 _0.380 ~0.545 _0.749 ~- _0.876 _0.923 _0.956 _0.965 _0.968 _0.974 _0.974 
_Rho long-run 0.233 __ 0.305 _0.382 ._0.549 _0.752 ._0.877 -- _0.925 _0.957 f----0.966 _0.969 _0.975 _0.975 _ 
Open. accum. short-run sub. 0 0 2 4 9 24 71 171 365 669 _1,097 _1,682 
Mod. short-run sub. 0 I 2 5 15 46 IOI 194 304 428 585 307 
Mod. short-run como. sub. 2 2 4 20 92 190 I 322 464 I 574 693 I 003 452 
Mod. short-run SDI 1149% 
--- --
9% f----11% f----45% __ 141% ~169% ~199% _210% ~170% ~133% _95% _27% 
_On-lending I.R. 1% _19% _17% _15% _13% _13% _12% _12% f----14% _15% _16% _17% 
Subsidy-free on-lending l.R 7% _20% 
---- . 
f----18% _22% _32% _35% 36% _37% f----39% _34% _31% _21% 
Open accum. lom!-run sub. 0 0 2 4 10 27 77 190 412 777 1.313 2 080 
Mod. lonl!-run sub. 0 I 2 6 17 51 112 223 364 536 767 435 
Mod. lonl!-run como. sub. 2 2 4 21 93 194 334 493 635 801 I, 186 581 
Figures in millions of nominal taka. 
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Table 5: Mod. subsidy for Grameen for society 
Oreanization Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen 
For the vear endine 31-Dec-83 31-Dec-84 31-Dec-85 31-Dec-86 31-Dec-87 31-Dec-88 31-Dec-89 31-Dec-90 31-Dec-91 31-Dec-92 31-Dec-93 31-Dec-94 
Rho short-run 0.229 _0.297 r---0.367 ,__0.532 _0.740 ~0.871 ~0.920 _0.953 _0.963 _0.966 ,___0.972 ,__0.972 
_Rho long-run 0.229 _0.298 _0.369 _0.534 _0.742 ~0.872 _0.920 _0.954 _0.963 _0.966 _0.973 _0.973 
---------·--~ -·-~-~-
_Open. accum. short-run sub. 0 0 1 3 6 17 48 117 253 470 794_ ,__1,236 
-----
Mod. short-run sub. 0 1 1 3 10 32 69 136 216 324 443 522 
Mod. short-run como. sub. 2 2 3 18 86 I 115 I 289 405 486 588 860 667 
Ooen accum. long-run sub. 0 0 1 3 7 18 51 126 275 520 899 1.436 
Mod. lone-run sub. 0 1 2 4 11 34 I 74 149 245 379 537 673 
Mod. lone-run comp. sub. 2 2 3 18 87 177 295 419 515 643 955 819 
Figures in millions of nominal taka. 
33 
Table 6: Subsidy, DLR, DOR, and pseudo-benefit-cost analysis for Grameen 
Oreanization I Grameen I Grameen I Grameen I Grameen I Grameen I Grameen I Grameen I Grameen I Grameen I Grameen I Grameen I Grameen 
For the year ending I 31-Dec-83 j 31-Dec-84131-Dec-85 I 31-Dec-86 I 31-Dec-87 I 31-Dec-88 I 31-Dec-89 I 31-Dec-90 I 31-Dec-91 I 31-Dec-92 I 31-Dec-93131-Dec-94 
~~~:~~1---~1 -}~_ii_j~- :1 =11 -~~~-~ -~1-=1 ~1 = 
Pomt ofv1ew of DH 
Trad. subsidy I (O)I (O)I o I o I O I O I I I 3 I 4 I 6 I 9 I 5 
Mod. short-run sub. I o I o I o I o I I I 2 I 3 I 6 I 8 I 11 I 16 I 8 
Mod. long-run sub. ________ 1---~~i- _ ~-\ _____ 0 I _0+--1 I 21-==4±-==--~j 10 I 14+-20+---12_ 
Accum. trad. sub. I-Co) (0) (0) -ol-0 I 0 . I : 4 l 8 I 14 l 23-~-
Acc.mod.short-runsub. I OI OI OI OI II 3i 61 121 201 311 471 55 
Acc. mod. long-run sub. __ I OJ 0 0 0 I 3 I 6 I 13 23 38 58 70_ 
Point ofview ofsociety § 
- -
Mod. short-run sub. ___ , ___ 0 I 0 \ 0 
Mod. long-run sub. 0 0 0 
1-!- 2j___4j__6j__9l--12l--14 
____ lj 2j__4j__7l--10_L_14l--18_ 
Acc. mod. long-run sub. __ j 0 0 0 -+---2 4 9 16 26 40 58 
Short-run DLR I U.76 I U.58 I U.70 I U.66 I 0.44 0.37 0.35 I 0.36 0.38 
I -
Long-runDLR 1 __ 0.76J_0.62J_0.66L 0.661 
Short-run DOR I 0.7 I 25.6 I 21.8 11.7 
_Long-run DOR ____ l __ 0.7 J __ 19.6 J_ 20.8 15.9 
10 
0 
25 
0 
0.01 
PV dollar-years debt_~2~6~8 PV social costs 0 0 0 
Accum. PV dollar-years debt 2_ 7 ____ 16 
Accum. PV social costs 0 0 0 
Req. ave. debtor surplus (b) 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Figures in millions of dollars as of Dec. 31, 1994. 
U.47 
0.57 
5.8 
9.9 
14 
0 
40 
1 
0.01 
0.49 
3.3 2.2 
5.8 3.8 
-+--- -+--
22 
+--- 1-+-1-
-l----6i.+-1 --
30 
2 
92 
3 
0.02 0.03 
0.39 
._0.44 0.41 0.39 ._0.39 +-----0.39 
1.5 1.4 1.4 2.0 2.4 
2.6 2.1 1.8 1.9 2.0 
-+---
37 41 56 99 144 
3 4 6 8 ---- IO 
129 170 226 326 469 
--+---
6 10 16 25 34 
0.05 0.06 0.01 I --+---0.08 0.07 
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Table7: Stylized income statement for Andes 
Organization Pro-Credito Pro-Credito Pro-Credito Andes 
For the year ending 31-Dec-92 31-Dec-93 31-Dec-94 31-Dec-95 
_Rev. lending 671 I 1,634+--3,926 I 4,904 
Rev. other op. I 
-51 54 113 251 
Rev. op. 722 1,688 4,040 5,155 
Grants as rev. I -0 0 0 0 
Total rev. 722 1,688 4,040 5,155 
------------ -
I -
I 
I 
_True exp. sub. debt __________ 0 I 315 I 1,165 2,839 
--------- -l 
-(Discount sub. debt) (1) i (298) I (l,087) I (l,685) 
Exp. sub. debt ____________ 
_________ l l 17 I 78~ 1,153 
-
True exp. other op. ______________ 
---- -- < ~ '.~~~)T _______ ( ~:~~~)-1---( ~:!~~) i 5,219 --(Discount other op.) (l,416) 
Exp. other op. 382 I 1,324 I 3,349 I 3,804 
Total exp. 383 1,340 3,427 4,957 
-
---
Acct. profit 339 348 613 198 
(Dividends) 0 I 0 0 I ' 0 
Change R.E. 339 348 
I 
613 198 
-
-
_Memo: Rev. op. 722j 1,688 4,040 5,155 
-
_Memo: (True exp. sub. debt) 0 i (315) t----(1,165)+--(2,839) 
Memo: (True exp. other op.) (1,769) I (3,231) (4,825) (5,219) 
Memo: True profit (l,047) I (l,858) I 0,950) I (2,903) 
Source: Financial statements of Pro-Credito and Caja los Andes. Figures in thousands of nominal 
bolivianos. 
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Table 8: Stylized balance sheet for Andes 
Organization Pro-Credito Pro-Credito Pro-Credito Andes 
For the year ending 31-Dec-92 31-Dec-93 31-Dec-94 31-Dec-95 
Assets 
-
_Net loan portfolio 2,828 6,368 13,804 29,707 
-Other assets 735 2,169 2,711 3,280 
Total assets 
-
3,564 8,537 16,515 32,987 
-
-
Liabilities 
-
Sub. debt 0 3,077 8,981 19,909 
-
ol _Dep. by poor 0 O! 0 
18 I 1.210 I 
-
Other libs. 330 2,612 
Total libs. 
·- ____ 18 i--3,407 _~_10,191-1 22,522 
--
---
Equity ~1 ~I ~-~ _Open. paid-in cap. 0 -Change paid-in cap. 0 
Close. paid-in cap. OHO 0i==r:~f _Open. cap. grants 0 3,207 4,442 5,023 -Grants as equity 3,207 1,235 581 3,944
Close. cap. grants 3,207~442~023t=8,967 _ 
_ Open. R.E. 0 339 686 1,299 _ 
Change R.E. 339 348 613 I 198 
Close R.E. 339 I 686 I 1,299 I 1,497 
Total equity 3,546 I 5,129 I 6,322 I 10,464 
Total libs. and equity 3,564 I 8,536 I 16,513 I 32,986 
_Memo: Ave. dep. by poor 0 ol 0 0 
-
Memo: Ave. sub. debt o I 1,538 6,029 ! 14,445 
-
Memo: Ave. net loan port. 1,414 i 4,598 l I 10,086 ! 21,755 
Source: Financial statements of Pro-Credito and Caja los Andes. Figures in thousands of nominal 
bolivianos. 
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Table 9: Trad. SDI for Andes 
Organization Pro-Credit Pro-Credit Pro-Credito Andes 
For the year ending 31-Dec-92 31-Dec-93 31-Dec-94 31-Dec-95 
Grants as rev. 0 01 0\ 0 
-
3,207 +--1,2351 581 I 
-
-
Grants as equity 3,944 
Disc. sub. debt 
___ 1: 298 ! 1,087 I 1,685 
- -------
-
Disc. other op. 1,387 I 1,907 ! 1,476 i 1,416 
4 forms new sub. rsrc. 4,595 I 3,441 I 3, 144 I 7,044 I 
Open. accum. new sub. 
--------
01 4,595_L_ 8,036 ! 11, 180 
-I I I 
I 
------
True profit (l ,047)! (1,858); (1,950), (2,903) 
Open. accum. true profi O! ( 1,04 7)1_ ____ (2,905)! ( 4,856) 
------ --- - -·------
--1 
! I I 
- -----~-------· ------
----- ____________ ,, __ , ______________ , _________ -·---··------ - ,___ _______ 
Trad. subsidy 369 i 888 I 1, l 07 • 1,650 
Trad. comp. subsidy 1,417 : 2,746 ! 3,057 I 4,553 
Trad SDI 
-=:211%1 
t68%L 78% 93% 
- --------~-----
36% 
i 
--- - r-On-lending LR. 47%1 39%i 23% I 
Subsidy-free on-lending I. 148% 95%1 69%1 43% 
Figures in thousands of nominal bolivianos. 
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Table 10: Mod. SDI for Andes 
Organization Pro-Credito Pro-Credito Pro-Credito Andes 
For the year ending 31-Dec-92 31-Dec-93 31-Dec-94 31-Dec-95 
Grants as rev. 0 0 
- ------I---- 0 0 
1,235 581 -3,944_ 
298 1,087 1,685 
_ Grants as equity 3,207 
Disc. sub. debt 1 
-
Disc. other op. 1,387 1,907 -1,476 1,416 
4 new sub. rsrc. 4,595 I 3,441 I 3,144 I 7,044 
4,595 8,036 11, 180 
-
Open. accum. new sub. 0 I __ , ___ _ 
I 
True profit 0,041) (1,858) (1,950) I (2,903) 
Open. accum. true profit ______ O __ f. __ (1,047)__,_l __ (2,905)_1 ___ (4,856)_ 
----------·------~----~----·~------! 
Dividends ________ . ____________ O j 0 _I 0 _L___ O _ 
Alpha l .ooo I l .OOO ~o f 1.000 
Rho short-run -----l.OOO-i--1.000-r=:== l.000------·--l.OOO-
Rho long-run_ - -----------_ -----1.000 ___ [=--= l .000 =i-= l .000 -~[~--=--~~-= l .000 = 
I . I 
~oe:.. ::~~~~::~~:~~~ ------5-3-~-: !,~!~ F ~:~~:-F ~:~~~ -
Mod.short-run comp. sub. 1,581 I 3,298 I 4,006 I 6,107 
Mod. short-run SDI 236% _ 202% t--102% _ 125% _ 
On-lending LR. 47%1 36% 39% 
-
159%-, Subsidy-free on-lending I.R. 107% 79% 
-
23% 
+----- -
51% 
Open accum. long-run sub. 0 I 534 2,096 
' 
4,600 
Mod. long-run sub. 534 i 1,562 I 2,504 ! 4,206 
Mod. long-run comp. sub. 1,581 i 3,420 I 4,454 ! 7,109 
Figures in thousands of nominal bolivianos. 
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Table 11: Mod. subsidy for Andes from society 
Urt?anization Pro-Credito Pro-Credito Pro-Credito Andes 
For the year ending 31-Dec-92 31-Dec-93 31-Dec-94 31-Dec-95 
Rho short-run 1.000 1.000 1.000 I 1.000 
-
_Rho long-run 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
-
_Open. accum. short-run sub. 0 242 907 1,918 
I -Mod. short-run sub. 242 665 1,011 1,548 
Mod. short-run comp. sub. l,289 I 2,523 I 2,962 I 4,451 I 
I 
Open accum. long-run sub. 0 242 932 2,042 
Mod. lone:-run sub. 242 I 690 I 1,109 I 1,762 
Mod. lone;-run comp. sub. L289 I 2,548 I 3,060 I 4,665 
Figures in thousands of nominal bolivianos. 
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Table 12: Subsidy, DLR and pseudo-benefit-cost for Andes 
Organization Pro-Credito Pro-Credito Pro-Credito Andes 
For the year ending 31-Dec-92 31-Dec-93 31-Dec-94 31-Dec-95 
_$-years debt in period ___ ._ __ 395+-l, 182 _L__ 2,400+=4,699 _ 
_ Accum. $-years debt 395 1,576 J_3,977 8,676 
I -
I 
Point of view of DFI 
Trad. subsidy 356 
Mod. short-run sub. 692 
_Mod. long-run sub. _____ , __ _ 909 
_,______ -
Accum. trad. sub. 951 
Acc. mod. short-run sub. 149 : 519 I 1,008 i 1, 700 
Acc. mod. long-run sub. _________________ 149 +----550_~ __ l,146_!, ___ 2,055 _ 
I I I 
·----· - ---~---------t-------r-------------1 
Point of view of society i I I I 
Mod. short-run sub. 
________ 67_(__ __ 111 I 241 ! 334 __ .. _____ 
-
Mod. long-run sub. 67 I 177 I 264 ' I 381 
-
-
-
Acc. mod. long-run sub. 67 245 509 890 
-
Short-run DLR 0.00 I 0.02 0.05 0.08 
Long-run DLR 0.00 i 0.02 I 0.04 
I 0.06 
- -
I 
I 
Short-run DOR 2.8 I 2.4 3.5 i 2.8 I 
Long-run DOR 2.8 I 2.5 I 3.0 i 2.9 I 
-
-
I 
I 
' 
I 
--
I 2,058 I PV dollar-years debt 375 1,066 3,828 
--
I 
i PV social costs 64 160 226 ! 310 
-
Accum. PV dollar-years debt 375 I 1,441 I 3,499 I 7,327 _ 
-
Accum. PV social costs 64 I 224 ! 451 I 761 I 
-
-I Req. ave. debtor surplus (b) 0.17 I 0.16 I 0.13 I 0.10 I 
Figures in thousands of dollars as of Dec. 31, 1995. 
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Appendix 1: The Parable of the Subsidized Servant 
Measuring the subsidy received by a subsidized development finance institution is like a rich 
man who left home to go to a far country. He called his three servants to entrust them with some of 
his property. The rich man left most of his wealth with bankers who paid 10 percent, compounded 
twice a year, but he also left 10,000 shekels with each of the three servants. Then the rich man left 
on his trip. 
The first servant went at once and left his money with the bankers. After a year, he got 
interest of 10,000·[1+(0.10/2)]2-10,000=1,025 shekels. 
The second servant went and built a granary out of bricks. After a year it was done and it was 
worth l 0,000 shekels. 
The third servant went off, dug a hole in the ground, and hid his master's money. 
After a year the rich man came back. He planned to take a trip again soon, so he called in the 
three servants to reckon the accounts. The first servant handed over the interest he had earned. "You 
gave me 10,000 shekels, sir," he said. "Look! Here is another 1,025." "Well done, good and faithful 
servant!" said his master. "You have been faithful in managing this amount, so I will leave you in 
charge of it." 
Then the second servant came in and said, "Master, you gave me 10,000 shekels, and I built 
this granary, also worth 10,000 shekels. With your permission, I will rent it out next year." The rich 
man was doubtful, but he liked the servant and wanted to trust him. "You have worked hard in 
managing this amount, so I will leave you in charge of it. But when I come back, I want to get at least 
10,000·[1+(0.10/2)]4-l 0,000=2, 155 shekels." 
Then the third servant came in and said, "Sir, I know you are a hard man; you reap where you 
did not sow, and you get a return where there was no trade. I was afraid, so I went off and hid your 
money in the ground. Look! Here are your 10,000 shekels." "You wicked and slothful servant!" his 
master said. "You knew, did you, that I reap where I did not sow and earn a return where there was 
no trade? Well, then, you should have put my money in the bank, and I would have got it all back 
now, with interest." 
The rich man began to give the order that the third servant be sold as a slave, along with his 
wife, cattle, and other property, in order pay for the debt of the interest that the rich man could have 
collected. The third servant fell on his knees and began to wail and gnash his teeth. "Be patient with 
me," he begged, "and I will pay you everything." The rich man took pity on him and said, "You may 
go, but I want to get at least 10,000·[1+(0.10/2)]4-10,000=2,155 shekels when I come back." 
Again the rich man left. The first servant went again and left his money with the bankers. In 
a year, he got 1,025 shekels. The second servant rented out his granary for the year for 2,000 shekels. 
The third servant crept behind the first servant, watching. He saw him leave his money with the 
bankers, so he did the same. 
After a year, the rich man came back. He again called in the three servants to reckon the 
accounts. The first servant handed over what he had earned. "You gave me 10,000 shekels, sir," he 
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said. "Look! Here are another 1,025." "Well done, good and faithful servant!" said his master. 
"Come on in and celebrate my return with me!" 
Then the second servant came in said, "Master, I earned 2,000 shekels renting the granary 
I built with your money. Here it is!" The rich man grew angry and began to throttle the servant. 
"Fool!", he said, "did you not know that I reap where I did not sow and earn a return where there was 
no trade? Well, then, you should have set the rent high enough to pay not only for the use of the 
10,000 over the two years, but also for the use of the interest I could have received during the two 
years but instead allowed you to keep!" The secon~ servant fell on his knees and began to beg. 
"Please sir, be patient with me," he said. "Now that my customers know the granary is safe, I can 
earn more than enough next year to cover the losses so far." But the rich man hardened his heart, and 
he had the second servant jailed until he could pay the debt of 155 shekels. 
Then the third servant came in and said, "Voila! You gave me 10,000 shekels, and here are 
another 1,025 that I have earned." "You wicked and slothful servant!" his master began. "Did you 
not know that I reap where I did not sow and earn a return where there was no trade?" The rich man 
signaled for the jailer. 
"Wait!" said the third servant. "If we ignore the fact that I did not pay you anything last year, 
then this year I got exactly what you could have got with the bankers." The rich man stopped. The 
third servant said: "That is how the subsidy of DFis is traditionally done." The rich man gave in. 
"Well done, good and faithful servant!" he said."Come on in and celebrate my return with me!" 
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Appendix 2: Calculations for the Grameen Bank 
The appendix has technical notes on the calculations for the Grameen Bank. The financial 
statements are from Hashemi ( 1997) for 1983 to 1986 and from Khandker et al. ( 1995) for 1987 to 
1994. In general, both subsidy and benefits have been underestimated while trying to replicate the 
assumptions and choices of Khandker et al. (1995) as closely as possible. When Khandker et al. 
(1995) veer from the logic of the traditional framework, it is always on the side of underestimating 
subsidy. Thus following Khandker et al. ( 1995) makes the results here both conservative and 
replicable. 
For example, this paper follows Khandker et al. (1995) in ignoring the implicit subsidy 
enjoyed by Grameen from exemption from reserve requirements for deposits (Yaron, 1992a). This 
paper also follows Khandker et al. (1995) in taking the 3-year deposit rate at the end of each period 
as reported by the International Monetary Fund as the opportunity cost to Grameen for both 
subsidized debt and subsidized equity. Not only is would the corre'ct rate be an average rate over a 
period, but also Grameen would not pay the 3-year deposit rate if it replaced its subsidized funds 
with market funds (Morduch, 1997). In addition, this rate does not have a premium for risk, nor does 
it distinguish between the opportunity costs of debt and of equity (Benjamin, 1994). Thus, the 
modified SDI here is still lower than it needs to be even though it is a higher lower bound on the 
subsidy received by Grameen than the traditional SDI in Khandker et al. ( 1995). 
This paper also uses the annual averages of stocks in Khandker et al. ( 1995) when those 
average are not the simple average of the stocks at the opening and the closing of the period. The 
discount on subsidized debt follows Khandker et al. ( 1995). 
Like Hashemi ( 1997) and Khandker et al. ( 1995), this paper pretends that Grameen did not 
exist before 1983. Excluding these years produces some erratic ratios in the first few years included 
in the analysis. Including the first years would increase the estimated subsidy because these years 
include fixed start-up costs and because economies of scale were still relatively unexploited. The 
increase in the estimated subsidy would be small, however, because Grameen was small and so its 
costs were small compared Grameen's later size and costs. 
Some of the erratic ratios in the first few years are also explained by the fact that Hashemi 
( 1997) is less detailed for 1983 to 1986 than is Khandker et al. ( 1995) for 1987 to 1994. Some 
assumptions had to be made for 1983 to 1986 that did not have to be made for 1987 to 1994. In 
particular, it was assumed that before 1987 there were no grants accounted for as revenue nor 
discounts on other operations. All debt from 1983-1986 was assumed to be subsidized, which is very 
close to the truth (Hossain, 1988). 
This paper diverges from Khandker et al. (1995) in that all grants are counted as equity. 
Grants will not be repaid like loans. Grants are not even a residual claim on Grameen. Since the 
opportunity costs of debt and equity are assumed equal, this does not affect the results. 
This paper also assumes that grants accounted for as equity caused any increase in equity not 
due to retained earnings nor to increases in paid-in capital. This causes some very small negative 
grants accounted for as equity in 1985 and 1986. 
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Khandker et al. ( 1995) ignore the fact that most of Grameen' s shares are privately owned. 
In 1995, members owned about 85 percent of Grameen's shares, and the government of Bangladesh 
owned the rest (Hashemi, 1997). The modified estimates in this paper underestimate subsidy by 
assuming that all shares are privately owned. The SDF given here ignores private owners for 
comparability with Khandker et al. ( 1995). 
This paper underestimates benefits by ignoring benefits accruing to Grameen's depositors 
and owners. In addition, the paper ignores any secondary benefits not accruing to customers of 
Grameen. It also ignores any benefits of the discipline infused by Grameen. Studies measuring the 
benefits of Grameen include Pitt and Khandker ( 1996), Goetz and Gupta ( 1996), and Hashemi et al. 
(1996). 
Flows of nominal taka are converted to dollars as of Dec. 31, 1994 as suggested by Christen 
(1997). First, the nominal taka flows in a period are inflated to units as of the end of the period using 
the average inflation rate in the period as computed with monthly data from the International 
Monetary Fund. Then this figure is inflated to units of taka as of Dec. 31, 1994 according to the 
inflation between the end of the period and the end of 1994. Finally, the taka are converted to dollars 
with the exchange rate as of the end of 1994. The conversion factor in Table 13 incorporates these 
three steps. It was assumed that the annual rate of change in the conversion factor from 1983 to 1986 
was the same as the annual rate of change between 1987 and 1989. 
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Table 13: Parameters and assumptions for Grameen 
Or2anization Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen Grameen 
For the year ending 31-Dec-83 31-Dec-84 31-Dec-85 31-Dec-86 31-Dec-87 31-Dec-88 31-Dec-89 31-Dec-90 31-Dec-91 31-Dec-92 31-Dec-93 31-Dec-94 
_Opp. cost sub. debt DFI __ 0.143 _0.143 _0.143 0.143 1-0.143 1-0.143 _0.143 '--0.140 0.138 0.130 0.130 0.060 
I- c-- I- I- -
_ Opp. cost equity DFI ___ 0.143 _0.143 _0.143 _0.143 '--0.143 '--0.143 '---0.143 _ 1--0.140 0.138 0.130 1-0.130 1-0.060 I- I-
_Opp. cost sub. debt society_ 0.100 _0.100_ _0.100 _0.100 1-0.100 '---0.100 '---0.100 1--0.100 0.100 0.100 1-0.100 _0.100 I- I-
_Opp. cost equity society __ 0.100 _0.100 _0.100 _0.100 _0.100 '---0.100 '---0.100 1--0.100 0.100 I- - _0.100 1-0.100 0.1 
Any private owners? ___ Yes Yes __ __ Yes_ Yes _Yes _ _ Yes_ _Yes _ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
- - -
-- -->- -
-
Conv. flow Taka to 12/31/94 0.0524 0.0485 0.0449 0.0417 0.0381 0.0352 0.0322 0.0298 0.0278 _0.0266 _0.0266 _0.0266 
- -
>- ~ 
- - - -- --
_Weight rich taxpayers 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
- -
Weight poor debtors 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Social discount rate 0.05 _0.05 _0.05 _0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 _0.05 0.05 0.05 _0.05 _0.05_ 
- -
Periods from time 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Discount factor 0.950 0.903 0.857 0.815 0.774 0.735 0.698 I 0.663 0.630 0.599 0.569 0.540 
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Appendix 3: Calculations for Caja los Andes 
The appendix has technical notes on the calculations for Andes. The data was collected in 
Bolivia in 1995. In constant to Grameen, the only known subsidies that are omitted for Andes are 
some expenses for training paid by donors in 1992. 
The opportunity costs of debt and of equity were based on the monthly average of the prime 
rate in Bolivia. A risk premium was added using the framework of Benjamin (1994). Still, the 
opportunity cost of debt and equity are lower than what Andes would probably pay in the market to 
replace its subsidized resources. 
Annual averages of stocks are the simple average of the stocks at the opening and the closing 
of the period. Since Andes has grown quickly, this understates the true average, but it makes 
replication of the calculations easier. 
Andes got a lot of subsidized resources as foreign consultants paid by donors. These expenses 
were valued at their cost to donors. Andes also got some grants accounted for as equity. About 
$ l 00,000 accounted for as a loan without interest or due date was shifted to grants accounted for as 
equity. Andes has had some debt from market sources. Although Andes could take deposits in 1995, 
it did not take any until 1996. 
All of Andes' equity is subsidized. When Pro-Credito morphed into Andes in 1995, there was 
a fa9ade that IO percent of the shares were bought by private people. But donors gave these people 
the money they used to buy the shares. Pro-Credito, itself nebulously owned, owns 60 percent of 
Andes. Donors own the other 30 percent. 
Flows of nominal bolivianos are converted to dollars as of Dec. 31, 1995 as with Grameen. 
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Table 14: Parameters and assumptions for Andes 
Or2anization Pro-Credito Pro-Credito Pro-Credito Andes 
For the year endin~ 31-Dec-92 31-Dec-93 31-Dec-94 31-Dec-95 
Opp. cost sub. debt DFI 0.228 0.229 0.232 0.255 
-
_Opp. cost equity DFI 0.208 0.205 0.193 0.197 
-
Opp. cost sub. debt society 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 
-
Opp. cost equity society 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 
-
_Any private owners? No No No No 
Conv. flow Bs to 12/3 l /94 $ 0.2790 0.2570 0.2380 0.2160 
- -- -
I I 1.0 I _Weight rich taxpayers 1.0 i 1.0 1.0 
-i 
-
Weight poor debtors ________ 
______ l.0 -~-----1.0 _) _____ 1.0 1.0 
-
Social discount rate o.o5 , o.o5 I o.o5 0.05 
-
Periods from time 0 l ! 2 3 ' 4 
Discount factor 0.950 I 0.903 I 0.857 I 0.815 
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